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Governance of Social Enterprises in South Yorkshire UK: Towards a new 
orientation. 
Abstract 
 
Social enterprise as a concept is at the core of the United Kingdom’s government 
strategies of ameliorating socio economic deprivation and has experienced 
phenomenal growth across the country over the years. Globalisation and increased 
demands for effective social welfare interventions is increasingly forcing social 
enterprises to evaluate their governance structures in addition to business models to 
ensure success and longevity of their operations. Consequently, there has been an 
upsurge of interest in the governance of social enterprises over the past 15 years as it 
has become apparent that financial sustainability of social enterprise also depends on 
effective decision making at strategic level and their ability to engage with a variety 
of stakeholders outside the social economy. Despite this increased in interest there are 
still significant gaps in the understanding and knowledge of how nature and type of 
governance model influence the operational efficiency of social enterprises. This is 
particularly in view of apparent shift from democratic to stewardship types of 
governance models of governance by some  social enterprise. The focus of this paper 
is on generating additional knowledge on the reasons of this paradigm shift in social 
enterprise governance, given lack of in-depth academic scrutiny on this phenomenon. 
The paper presents and critically analyses key results emerging from a doctoral 
investigation on the governance of social enterprise in South Yorkshire.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Globalisation and increased demands for effective social welfare interventions are 
forcing social enterprises to evaluate their governance structures in addition to 
business models to ensure success and longevity of their operations (Douglas, 1994; 
Palmaas ,2002). These external forces,  particularly increased competition for 
resources have made it imperative for  social enterprises  to review their  governance 
models to mobilise resources and expertise essential for growth, particularly beyond 
the social economy (O’Regan and Oster, 2005; Simons,2000). The nature of 
traditional social enterprise governance models however is posing the greatest 
challenge to achieve these aims (Low, 2006). Historically, social enterprises have 
been governed through democratic models that emphasises the development of trust 
and solidarity among those involved and not necessary geared towards supporting 
commercial activities (Low, 2006). It is not surprising that contemporary discourses in 
social enterprise governance suggest that some social enterprises are drifting towards 
stewardship governance models as the complexities and shortcomings associated with 
democratic governance models become more apparent (Low, 2006; Cornforth, 1988; 
Mason et al, 2006). This includes recruiting directors on the basis of their skills as 
well as fostering a much closer and professional working relationship between the 
boards and managers (Callen et al, 2009; Mason et al, 2006).This   shift in discourses 
and practice from democratic to other forms of governance models of social enterprise 
have provided the motivation for this study. It is against this background that the 
governance of social enterprise the UK and specifically, South Yorkshire is discussed 
and critically analysed in this paper.   Discussions will start with contested 
understanding of social enterprise as a concept, then a general discussion of corporate 
governance theory, underpinned by Agency theory (AT), Stewardship Theory (ST) 
and Resource Dependency theory (RDT. This is then followed by analysis and 
discussion of governance of social enterprise in the context of corporate governance 
theory. Using a case study approach, the paper then analyses governance of social 
enterprise in South Yorkshire. The paper will conclude by discussing findings of the 
investigation on social enterprise undertaken in this region and their implications on 
policy formulation. 
 
 
Social Enterprise: A Definition 
 
Social enterprise is an emerging concept and still suffers from largely unresolved 
conceptual and definitional issues (Martin and Thompson, 2010).  However, 
researchers and academics generally agree that a social enterprise is a business that 
seeks to bring people and communities ‘together for economic development and 
social gain’ (Martin and Thompson, 2010:6). The UK defines a social enterprise as a 
business with ‘primarily social objectives and whose surpluses are principally re-
invested for that purpose in the business, or in the community, rather than being 
driven by the need to maximise profit for shareholders and owners’ (DTI 2002:7). 
Alter (2004:1) puts it more simply as the new ‘institutional animal, which is part 
business and part social’. Unlike conventional commercial businesses, surpluses or 
profits generated by social enterprises are reinvested into the organisation to develop 
its capacity to deliver more services or goods to the communities that they serve 
(Reis, 1999; DTI, 2002). This implies that there is no distribution of profits or 
material gain to those that are involved in the enterprise (Martin and Thompson, 2010, 
DTI, 2002). Despite different views on its definition, there is consensus that a social 
enterprise is first and foremost, a business engaged in some form of trading to produce 
a surplus or profit (Stutt, 2001).Social enterprises , by their nature, embedded in the 
communities they serve. They come in a variety of forms such as development trusts, 
co-operatives, social firms, credit unions, community finance initiatives, community 
businesses and trading arms of charities (Marshall and Lovatt, 2004).  
 
Governance of Social Enterprise Firms  
 
The governance of firms, and particularly the role of the board and its impact on 
performance, continues to attract the interest of researchers (Nicholson, 2004). Monks 
and Minow (1995:1) describe corporate governance as ‘the relationship among 
various participants in determining the direction and performance of a corporation’. 
The board, according to Daily et al (2003), is the locus of the internal governance of a 
corporation and performs several key roles. These include making key decisions and 
providing the necessary direction and strategic focus required for the organisation to 
achieve its objectives (Low, 2006, Bridge et al, 2009, Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; 
Zahra and Pearce, 1989).The board can also be a link to the firm’s external 
environment, providing the infrastructure to access the resources and advice required 
to achieve its objectives. This particular function is associated with the resource 
dependency approach (Daily et al, 2003; Dalton et al, 1998; Hung, 1998).  Several 
researchers, amongst them Daily et al (2003), Mason et al (2006), Muth and 
Donaldson (1998) and Hillman and Dalziel (2003), argue that the board can also act 
as an agent of its stakeholders such as shareholders and investors and perform the task 
of monitoring and controlling management activities on their behalf. This particular 
role is associated with agency theorists. The board of directors also recruits, appoints 
and holds accountable the top management of the firm responsible for operational 
issues (Cohen and Cyert, 1965). Zahra and Pearce (1989) summarise the above 
functions or roles of the board as service, control and strategic. 
 Agency Theory (AT) 
The emergence of the modern corporation resulted in the ownership and control of 
resources being separated (Berle and Means, 1932; Machold and Vasudevan,2004) 
and this separation is one of the dominant themes of the economic theory of the firm 
(Demsetz, 1983). Cohen and Cyert (1965) suggest that the reason for this separation 
might be the owners’ or stockholders’ reluctance to get involved in the day to day 
operations of the firm. They therefore appoint a board of directors to shape the firm’s  
strategic direction and development.  Berle and Means (1932) argue that the  
separation of ownership and control can result in a divergence of interests between  
owners of firms and managers. For example, managers have the potential to pursue  
their own interests if they have effective control of the firm’s resources (Cohen and  
Cyert, 1965). Furthermore, the owners of the business stock can lose control over  
their resources if ownership becomes spread across a number of shareholders. This  
may provide autonomy for managers in the utilisation of resources and increase the  
likelihood of them pursuing their own interests (Berle and Means, 1932; Demsetz,  
1983).This separation of power and control in modern corporate forms gives rise to  
the principle–agent problem which gave rise to the Agency Theory (Berle and Means,  
1932). This theory is grounded in the fields of economics and financial research and   
is considered as one of the dominant theoretical perspectives in the literature on  
corporate governance (Daily et al, 2003; Muth and Donaldson, 1998; Zahra and  
Pearce, 1983). Agency theory is underpinned by the ’model of man’ which assumes  
that shareholders will lose control as the firm grows and that managers will prioritise  
their own interests above those of the organisation (Donaldson and Davis, 1991;  
Muth and Donaldson, 1998). As a firm develops and expands, it is not uncommon for  
the owners or stockholders to delegate responsibility and authority to managers  
(agents) to run the firm on their behalf (Davis et al, 1997).The key concern for owners  
of the organisations has always been the amount of control that managers should  
have (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory therefore, in its paradigmatic form,  
analyses the relationship between the principal (stockholder) and the agent, who is  
responsible for implementing the tasks delegated by the principal (Eisenhardt, 1989.  
Agency theory however has been criticised for its underlying economic assumptions. 
Doucouliagos (1994) and Perrow (1986), argues that there is a need to consider non-
economic motivations when analysing human behaviour in firms. Jensen and 
Meckiling (1976) agree that agency theory takes an over simplistic approach to 
analysing corporate and human behaviour which is actually much more complex and 
influenced by a wider range of factors.  
 
Resource dependency theory (RDT) 
 
Given the importance of the board of directors’ role in corporate governance, extant 
literature does not sufficiently reveal the relationship between board independence 
and the financial performance of firms (Dalton et al, 1998; Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003). Whilst the AT theory focuses on the board’s monitoring and controlling role, 
the Resource Depedency (RD)  theoretical approach explain how directors ensure that 
their organizations access the resources they need.(Daily et al, 2003). This relatively 
underexplored approach focuses on the exchange relationship between the firm and its 
external environment (Davis and Cobb, 2009; Corcoran and Shackman, 2007). In 
order to ensure its long term survival, the firm co-ops scarce resources key to 
achieving this objective (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Work from this theoretical 
perspective is mainly associated with Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Other authors who 
have written extensively on this concept include Daily et al (2003) and Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003). However, despite its increasing prominence in the literature on 
governance there is very little empirical work based on RDT (Davis and Cobb, 2009; 
Mudambi and Pedersen, 2007). Bazerman and Schoorman (1983) suggest that the 
Resource Dependency Theory approach has four benefits in that it focuses on network 
connections among directors, horizontal coordination, vertical coordination and 
expertise and reputation. Hillman and Dalziel (2003) refer to these collectively as 
board capital, consisting of both human and relational capital necessary in assisting an 
organisation to mobilise key resources. 
 What underpins the RDT is the notion that the external environment is the source of 
scarce resources that the organisation requires for survival and access to these 
resources is competitive (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Dwyer et al, 1987). The greatest 
challenge for organisations comes from their inability to exert any form of control 
over this environment and its negative effect on managerial discretion. Pfeffer and 
Salancik, (1978) and Scott (1998) argue that this creates uncertainty and dependency 
for organisations and so provides the impetus for them to develop creative strategies 
to exploit these resources and therefore minimise this dependency and uncertainty 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978;Heide 1994). These authors go on to argue that firms need 
either to develop internal mechanisms to minimise resource dependency or to adapt to 
the demands of the external environment. A board is therefore successful from an 
RDT perspective when its ability to raise necessary resources is strengthened (Callen 
et al, 2009;Ulrich and Barney, 1984).        
The RDT approach provides a useful lens that allows a firm to identify key resources 
needed to achieve its objectives. Like any theoretical approach, the RDT has its 
weaknesses. The literature on RDT does not, for example, provide insight on 
customer satisfaction and values. In addition, while this theory acknowledges multiple 
dependencies, Hillman et al, (2009,) argue that RDT does not explicitly outline how a 
firm prioritises them. 
Stewardship model (ST) 
 
Stewardship Theory (ST) is a relatively new approach to corporate governance and 
offers an alternative perspective in which managerial motivation can be more 
comprehensively critiqued and analysed (Davis et al, 1997). This theory which 
emerged from the fields of sociology and psychology is associated with the work of 
researchers such as Muth and Donaldson (1998), Donaldson and Davis(1991).  
Under the ST model, which is typical in for-profit organisations, the role of the board 
of directors is that of an adviser and strategy formulator (Nicholson, 2004; Silk, 
2004). The role of the manager is that of a ‘steward’ rather than an individual seeking 
to maximise his/her own utility as agency theory assumes (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998, p.5). The motivation of senior managers in the corporation is not a matter of 
concern under this theory. They are assumed to be essentially trustworthy and pro-
organisation and their role is to ensure that the resources of the organisation are 
efficiently employed to attain financial sustainability in contrast to the AT approach 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Jenkins et al, 2007). Stewardship theory acknowledges 
the importance of non-financial motivational factors for management. These include 
intrinsic factors such as the need for achievement, affiliation, recognition, autonomy 
and authority (Muth and Donaldson, 1989). 
The ST approach assumes that there is no conflict between shareholders and 
management as the latter’s interests are assumed to be isomorphic with those of the 
former (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Davis et al, 1992). It is taken as read that, as 
managers (stewards) work autonomously towards the maximisation of shareholders 
wealth through high performance, their own utility functions are simultaneously 
maximised (Low, 2006, Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis et al, 1997). Essential to 
achieving this objective are flexible governance structures which empower senior 
managers to make executive decisions and exploit opportunities for the organisation 
to attain its objectives efficiently . (Donaldson and Davis,1991; Donaldson, 1985). 
Such governance structures can, for example, allow the Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) of the firm to chair the board of directors, a situation that would not occur 
under the AT approach due to its insistence on the separation of ownership and 
control (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). This shift of corporate control from 
stockholders to operational managers or executives can be regarded as a significant 
improvement on agency theory.  
However, recent high profile corporate failures in such huge organisations as Enron, 
Worldcom and Parmalat challenge this assumption and therefore also the ability of the 
stewardship model to ensure accountability and efficiency in firms (Guthree and 
Turnbull, 2002; Doherty et al, 2009; Low 2006).  
The paper now  focuses on governance of social enterprise .This is discussed in the 
context of  Agency Theory (AT), Resource Dependency Theory (RDT) and 
Stewardship Theory (ST) and their implications for social enterprise. 
 
GOVERNANCE OF SOCIAL ENTERPRISE  
Whilst corporate governance is not new in the commercial sector, it is increasingly 
coming under scrutiny in the social economy (Low, 2006). There is consensus among 
researchers that the governance of social enterprise is still theoretically 
underdeveloped (Mason et al, 2006). However over the years researchers such as 
Abzug and Galaskiewicz (2001), Child and Rodrigues, 2004 and, most recently, Low 
and Chinnock (2008) have undertaken insightful empirical work on social enterprise 
governance. Traditionally, social enterprises have been governed through democratic 
models that emphasise the value of participation and stakeholder involvement rather 
than personal ownership and surplus distribution (Pfeffer, 1973; Iecovich, 2005; 
Pearce, 2003, Chell, 2007; Birkhoelzer et al, 1992). The democratic governance 
model therefore implies that personal ownership and profit distribution should not be 
part of the defining characteristics of a social enterprise ( Birkhoelzer et al (1997) 
.Pearce (2003) argues that  shared ownership is what makes the governance of social 
enterprise unique and sets it apart from conventional businesses 
This type of governance has its origins in the philanthropic organisations of the 
nineteenth century and continues to be a key feature of the governance of 
contemporary social enterprises (Evers, 2001). The boards of directors or trustees 
associated with the governance of social enterprises are usually voluntary in nature 
(Barker, 2003; Pearce, 2003; Evers, 2001; Paton, 2003). The individuals on these 
boards do not receive any form of financial remuneration for their participation in 
these organisations (DTI, 2002). This is consistent with the view of most 
contemporary researchers on management theory and practice of non-profit 
organisations such as Cohen and Cyert (1965) who argue that not all stakeholders are 
motivated by financial considerations. (2001) and Campbell (2007) argue that, despite 
being voluntary, such boards of directors are pivotal to the success of social enterprise 
because they are vital in ensuring accountability, legitimacy and transparency in the 
operations of such organisations. Other researchers, such as Etchart and Davis 
(2003b) and Ridley-Duff (2002b), however, are of the opinion that the democratic 
governance associated with volunteer-dominated boards is inconsistent with the 
operations of a modern business. They argue that this type of governance model is 
characterised by a lack of macro-perspective and does not promote ownership or 
foster partnerships with a wider stakeholder base involving institutions beyond the 
social economy.  
Agency theory and governance of social enterprise 
 Given that a social enterprise has no shareholders or stockholders in a commercial 
sense, Abzug and Galaskiewicz (2001) and Low and Chinnock  (2008) argue that it is 
difficult to identify the principal and the agent. In addition, since the governance of 
social enterprise is underpinned by democratic and participatory principles, it is 
highly unlikely that senior managers of such enterprises would engage in self serving 
activities (Mason et al, 2006). Since social enterprises are traditionally driven by 
democratic models of governance, it is evident that this type of governance 
contradicts the AT approach, at the core of which is an independent board free from 
managerial influence (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). Furthermore, McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999) note that a lack of clear separation of powers between the executive 
and operational staff in non-profits can create a minimalist board and negatively affect 
efficiency. This type of board tends to be run by an individual or dominated by strong 
founder members, with little or no conflict, challenge or dissent occurring either 
amongst themselves or from external stakeholders (Spear et al, 2007). Such situations 
are inconsistent with the AT approach that advocates for a clear separation of roles 
between the board and the executive to ensure efficiency (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). Unlike for-profit organisations the board is regarded as a ‘tool of democratic 
participation’ (Low, p.4 .2006).  
Despite these criticisms, Callen et al (2009) believe the AT approach is still relevant 
to the critical analysis of how social enterprises operate. The researchers cite 
specifically the role that the board plays in protecting the organisation’s assets and 
controlling the activities of managers so as to maintain costs and prevent 
misallocation of resources. The function of the board is to represent the interests of 
the community as well as the interests of various constituents and groups and to 
ensure that enterprise’s assets are not abused (Iecovich, 2005).  Barker (2002) 
concurs, noting that there is evidence of independent boards of nonprofits developing 
mechanisms to control the activities of their senior managers in order to ensure that 
their actions and interests are in tandem with those of the social enterprises .This view 
is supported by Fama and Jensen (1983) who suggest that mechanisms to control 
assets and monitor activities and staff of non-profits are essential, since these 
organisations do not normally possess residual assets. 
Resource dependency and social enterprise 
RDT is relevant to the social enterprise sector because boards on nonprofits are keen 
to increase the flow of resources from external constituencies. Indeed having 
difficulty in raising capital is a chronic problem in the social enterprise sector (Callen 
et al, 2009). Social enterprises are increasingly looking for innovative ways to 
mobilise resources and expertise beyond the social economy (O’Regan and Oster, 
2005; Barker, 2003). Strategies include recruiting directors on the basis of their ability 
to positively influence the outside world to the advantage of their organisations 
(Callen et al, 2009). This approach is particularly useful to social enterprises as they 
tend to rely on human and social capital rather than material resources. The board 
therefore acts as a link to the external environment, which can facilitate access to 
resources. Pfeffer (1973), in his research on the governance of hospitals in the USA, 
discovered that boards tended to co-opt well known community leaders as a 
fundraising strategy. Researchers such as Iecovich (2005), Provan (1980) and Muth 
and Donaldson (1998) refer to this type of strategy as ‘boundary spanning’. It is 
evident that this is consistent with the RDT approach .Barker (2002), observes that 
some social enterprises deliberately target specific individuals for recruitment to their 
boards, based on their potential to assist the social enterprise in gaining access to 
specific resources or technical expertise.  
Stewardship theory and social enterprise 
 
There is little literature on stewardship theory in the non-profit and social enterprise 
sectors. Researchers such as Pfeffer and Salanckik, (1978), O’Regan and Oster 
(2005), Miller and Millensen (2003) and Iecovich (2005) and most recently Low 
(2006), have written extensively on the nature of non-profit governance and how this 
affects their outcomes. It is clear that some social enterprises are considering the 
stewardship governance model. Van Slyke (2000)’s findings in his study on social 
enterprises involved in public sector contracting support this contention. His findings 
showed that the stewardship model is becoming a viable alternative for social 
enterprises seeking to be competitive in a hostile economic environment.  
Globalisation and increased competition for resources has made it imperative for 
social enterprises to consider other forms of economic relations (Douglas, 1994; 
Palmaas ,2002).  In addition, dwindling public and philanthropic support has exposed 
weaknesses in institutional forms of traditional social enterprises in terms of their 
capacity to acquire additional resources (Etchart and Davis, 2003). Low (2006) argues 
that such economic developments may force social enterprises to move from 
democratic to stewardship models of governance in order to attract the investments 
essential for their growth. In support of this view, Cornforth (1988) stresses that the 
social or democratic type of ownership is not attractive to venture capitalists. Given 
that social enterprises are hybrids, pursuing both commercial and social objectives, 
their boards and management need to have the autonomy necessary to operate and 
generate value for the organisation and the communities it serves.  
There is evidence that contemporary social enterprise governance  appears to be 
drifting towards a stewardship model because of the complexities of trading 
associated with democratic governance models . (Low, 2006; Dart, 2004). Although 
the traditional democratic governance structures of social enterprises are still relevant 
within the social economy, several researchers such as Batra, (1996); Etchart and 
Davis (2003), Barker (2003), Ridley-Duff (2002b) and influential support 
organisations in the social economy such as Social Enterprise London (SEL, 2001) 
have questioned their effectiveness given the current economic competitive 
environment facing social enterprises. They argue that organisations with 
independent, predominantly voluntary boards are incapable of managing their 
commercial activities effectively and transparently, hence the increasing interest in the 
stewardship model of governance. In addition, as more opportunities for social 
enterprises emerge, particularity in public service delivery, they are likely to engage 
more with external stakeholders including suppliers, investors and the community 
(Lewis et al, 2004; Low, 2006; Salamon and Anheier ,1996). These developments and 
views strongly suggest a multi-disciplinary and more inclusive approach to 
management and decision making for social enterprise so that they can exploit 
opportunities as they arise (OECD, 1999a; Batra, 1996).  
Nevertheless, researchers and academics urge caution in this drift towards the 
stewardship model. For example, Spear et al (2007) and Low (2006), argue that the 
expansion of social enterprises’ thematic activities inevitably raises concerns about 
their ability to manage entrepreneurial activities without compromising their social 
ethos.  
 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION 
 
Being a relatively new concept social enterprise is under researched in the UK and 
indeed the world over (BRASS, 2006). Consequently a lot of literature on this concept 
is largely in the grey form. Where it exists, it is largely fragmented. Salamon (1994) 
concurs by saying that by their nature, non-profits are quite diverse and this further 
exacerbates their documentation and analysis. Social enterprises in South Yorkshire 
exist within a formal and informal structure, influenced by both internal and external 
factors. Researching social enterprise in this region was a particularly complex 
undertaking given lack of published information on the sector. It was therefore crucial 
to employ a robust methodology to gain a deeper understanding of the social 
enterprise concept and how it continues to evolve.  
 
The investigation used an in-depth case study approach, a methodology which is 
increasingly gaining prominence in social sciences despite not being listed in major 
research texts (Tellis, 1997). The increased use of this method has resulted in an 
extensive body of knowledge dedicated to its development and refinement (Kohn, 
1997; Yin , 2003; Tellis, 1997; Stake, 1995).  Kohn (1997) in particular argues that 
the use of the case study research method is gaining ascendancy because of the 
shortcomings of other data collection methods in providing answers to important 
questions researchers are asking parallel investigation on social enterprise support 
organisations within the study area was undertaken. This method provided an 
opportunity for the researcher to analyse different stakeholders within the target 
population and to strengthen conclusions from the data collected through triangulation 
(Webb et al, 1996, Stake 1995).  
 
 Due to the diversity in types and thematic activities of social enterprises, a multiple 
case study approach was considered as the most ideal in this investigation. This 
approach allowed the researcher to explore new areas and themes where very little 
theory was available to explain a phenomenon (Kohn, 1997). Towill (2006) notes that 
the use of a multi-method approach also makes it easier for a researcher to achieve 
validity by triangulating different sources of evidence and theory. The case study 
analysis involved a comparative analysis of four (4) case studies, as shown below in 
Table 2.  
Table 2: Cases under investigation 
Organisation Thematic Activity Type of legal structure 
The Trainer    Provision of basic 
education and training 
Share capital (CLS 
The Landscaper Environmental 
management &consultancy   
Share capital (CLS 
The Cafe Environmental 
preservation and 
renewable energy 
Limited by Guarantee 
(CLG) 
The Community 
Champion 
Provision of non-
accredited skills training 
Limited by Guarantee 
(CLG) 
 
 
Selecting case studies for scrutiny has always generated debate among researchers. 
The selection process often raises issues of internal and external validity (Kohn, 
1997). There is consensus however that case study based research is different from 
sampling research (Tellis, 1997). The process of case study selection needs to be 
carried out in a way that maximises learning. Therefore the selection of case studies 
for this investigation was based on the need to illustrate the diversity, 
representativeness, nature and character of the social enterprises under scrutiny 
(Pharaoh et al, 2004). For the purpose of this investigation, social enterprises 
operating across the South Yorkshire region comprised the accessible population. 
Despite evidence of some mapping exercises having taken place in the subregion, the 
number of social enterprises operating in South Yorkshire has been difficult to 
ascertain (DTI, 2003). However based on current knowledge, experience and 
extrapolation of figures from information held by sub-regional social enterprise 
support organisations, it was possible to estimate number of social enterprises in the 
region. This number was put at no more than 400 social enterprises at various stages 
of development. The researchers used their knowledge and contacts in key social 
enterprise support organisations across the region to identify suitable cases for 
scrutiny. 
 
Four (4) case studies were selected and given fictitious names to anonymise them. 
Two had CLG legal structures (The Cafe and the Community Champion) and the 
remainder (The Landscaper and The Trainer), with CLS legal structures. 
 Social enterprises with IPS cooperative legal structures were not considered despite 
this being a common structure for social economy organisations. A large body of 
knowledge already exists on this type of legal structure, whose origins can be traced 
back to the early nineteenth century. Social enterprises with CLG and CLS legal 
status is  an area requiring further investigation to understand the development and 
operations of social enterprises (Low, 2006;Barker,2003). Two examples of social 
enterprises structured as company limited by shares were selected from Sheffield. The 
reason for this is that at the time of the research, such structures were only available in 
Sheffield. It is important to note that during this period the Community Interest 
Company (CIC), which has a share capital variant, had just been unveiled and no 
social enterprises within the survey sample had adopted it. The share capital model 
under analysis in this study preceded the CIC and was developed and pioneered in 
Sheffield as explained in preceding sections of this paper. A semi-structured interview 
guide attached as Appendix 1 was used to collect relevant data from the selected 
cases. The key informants selected and interviewed were the founders of the social 
enterprises and senior managers. 
 
Analysis of case study qualitative data 
The data collected from interviews of key informants was recorded, transcribed and 
manually analysed through an inductive process of replication, which enabled the 
researcher to critically analyse each case study and manually identify the emerging 
themes. This method of textual data analysis is consistent with the work of researchers 
such as Kohn (1997), Miles and Huberman (1994), Bryman and Bell (2003), Yin 
(2003), Straus and Corbin, (2008),  Cassell and Symon (2004) and Basit (2003), 
amongst others. Comparisons were then made to ascertain if there was a similar 
pattern across all four case studies that could be generalised, a method recommended 
by Kohn (1997) and Miles and Huberman (1994). While the researchers were aware 
that the use of computer aided qualitative data analysis software CAQADS can make 
analysis of qualitative data more efficient, a manual approach, though time consuming 
was deemed more appropriate. For example, trials using NUD.IST showed that it was 
difficult to accurately identify emerging themes because respondents used different 
terms to explain the same issue (Catterall and MacLaran ,1997)  
 
 
Codes were then generated and assigned to key words and phrases relevant to the 
research question. This made it possible to identify relevant information or construct 
themes relevant to a specific research question (Bryman and Bell, 2003 ;Agar, 1980).  
Each transcript was then examined  highlighting any words, sentences, illuminative 
quotes or phrases that related to a specific theme, such as ‘type of legal structure’ . 
Further analysis of these highlighted excerpts revealed additional or sub themes, 
thereby enabling the researcher to organise the data into coherent categories that were 
interlinked (Agar, 1980; Taylor-Powell and Renner, 2003).  This method therefore 
facilitated cross case analysis by ‘surfacing common themes and directional 
processes’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994 p.69), a process that Tesch (1990) describes as 
data distillation. The frequency of occurrence of each phrase, word or sentence was 
recorded under each case study’s transcript. When these frequencies were compiled at 
the end of the analysis, they revealed a pattern of themes or an anatomic framework of 
emerging data (Kaplan, 1964; Basit, 2003; Chen and Meindl, 1991). The data analysis 
process used is shown in figure 1 
Figure1. Analysis of data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS AND KEY FINDINGS 
 
Analysis of the composition of the board of directors and the functions of the boards 
of the cases under investigation painted an intriguing picture.  
Board structure and composition of CLG case studies 
Focussing on the governance of The Cafe and The Community Champion, results 
show that their boards consist entirely of unpaid volunteers. These volunteers sitting 
on the board also include operational management staff.  The respondent from The 
Community champion said ‘we are all volunteers; we don’t want to get anything out 
of this…I mean…financially. We are here to help the community’.  These volunteers 
Collect data using interview guide 
Generate and assign codes according to 
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Scrutinize each transcript and highlight 
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are therefore motivated by philanthropic rather than economic considerations in their 
involvement in the governance of these social enterprises. The individuals on the 
boards of these organisations have not been selected on the strength of the specific 
skills or knowledge that they bring to the organisation, but rather because of their 
passion for the community and its well being. The respondent from The Cafe made 
this clear when he said, ‘we [the directors] could be doing other financially rewarding 
things in our life....we want to help the community and this is what brought us 
together’. 
Board structure and composition of CLS case studies 
The results show that social enterprises with CLS legal structures have an added 
dimension to their boards of directors. In addition to typical for-profit shareholders, 
voluntary organisations and their respective lead entrepreneur hold some shares. In 
this case, there is a distinct move from traditional forms of participative and 
democratic management principles as social entrepreneurs take the lead and provide 
hands-on management of the social enterprise. One of the social enterprises hd a 
repesantatve of a funder on its board.. As the Landscaper informant said, ‘Of course 
having a funder on the board is good thing...perhaps they will give us more money 
when they can see how well we are doing’. The development of such multi-
stakeholder boards in social enterprises reveals the need for innovation in order to 
meet the challenges of globalisation and other external influences in particular the 
need to adapt and widen sources of expertise, a significant feature of modern firms .  
 
The presence of voluntary boards of directors in the governance of share capital social 
enterprises also raises eyebrows. Closer scrutiny of these organisations’ memoranda 
and articles of association revealed that this voluntary board of directors, in essence, 
hold shares that do not benefit from capital gain, but serve the purpose of a social 
lock. This social lock, ensures that the organisation does not compromise the 
achievement of its social aims. This vital purpose was confirmed by the respondent 
from The Trainer, who ,in reference to these board members, remarked ’they vote on 
decisions pertaining to the overall direction of the company... They ensure that social 
ethos is maintained and that the company remains a social enterprise’.  
Board functions 
 
CLG Board Functions 
 
 For cases with CLG legal status their boards demonstrate democratic governance 
principles, associated with social enterprise, such as social ownership and 
participation of community members in the running of the organisation. In addition to 
setting the strategic direction of the organisation and ratifying decisions, the boards of 
directors of The Cafe and The Community Champion also control and direct the 
organisations’ day to day activities. These activities, particularly monitoring and 
control of activities are consistent with the Agency theory. In this case the boards are 
agents of their stakeholders 
For example, the respondent from The Community Champion remarked, ‘the board 
works closely with the manager and operational staff...we monitor everything because 
as I have said, our activities are funded and we have to be accountable to funders’. 
Regarding the function of its board, the respondent from The Cafe said ‘everything is 
done democratically, but it is our duty to ensure that the staff are doing their duties, 
because we are accountable to the community and funders’. These responses show 
that, although not usually possessing residual assets, social enterprises do need to 
protect the assets they have from abuse.  
 
The boards’ functions, however, appear to be incongruent with the democratic 
governance models associated with social enterprise. This type of governance 
emphasises values of participation and employee involvement in the governance of 
the social enterprise. However, it appears to be presenting operational problems, 
typified by The Community Champion. By closely controlling the activities of 
managers as well as making and ratifying decisions, the board is effectively 
implementing its own decisions, a situation the organisation itself acknowledges. ’We 
need a management team….we don’t find time to sit back and try to look forward to 
find our direction…it’s an area we badly miss out on’. These statements reveal that 
executive and governance roles in social enterprise governance models are not clearly 
delineated and therefore can create dysfunction.  
 Curiously, senior management positions in both organisations were unpaid and their 
respective boards stated that they expected volunteers to fill these posts. The chief 
executive of The Cafe showed the characteristics of a volunteer in the true sense of 
the word when he said ‘I am the manager, but volunteer manager really, but also a 
director…I am employed elsewhere and I come here a couple of days per week’. 
Similarly, the manager of The Community Champion runs a commercial organisation 
of his own and volunteers his time, one day per week, to the social enterprise. He said, 
‘My background is commercial, I come out of business and volunteer my services, but 
charities and charitable businesses are all new to me’. Although these individuals are 
part of the boards of their respective organisations, it does not appear that their 
commercial expertise is being exploited for the benefit of the organisation.  
While The Cafe and The Community Champion do not have any external share 
holders whom they have to satisfy financially, they have stakeholders such as the 
community members who vote and appoint directors onto the board. The duties of 
these boards are largely fiduciary i.e. holding the organisation and its assets in trust. 
This is a characteristic of democratic governance models associated with the non-
profit sector. Although the boards of The Community Champion and The Cafe 
perform a strategic role, this is severely limited by lack of an enterprise culture and 
failure to clearly separate the roles of the board and executives.  
CLS Board function 
The functions and roles of the board of directors of the enterprises with CLS legal 
status differ from those discussed above. Unlike those with CLG legal status, there is 
a clear attempt by the board to provide autonomy for senior managers to work in the 
best interests of the organisation. Perhaps this is because of the extended stakeholder 
interest arising from their legal structure and the need to take into account views and 
inputs from those who have vested interests in the organisation. As the respondent 
from The Trainer said, ‘We have a good board... they let us do the work. We go to 
them for advice on issues affecting the organisation... the senior managers here ...we 
let them get on with it’. The respondent from The Landscaper also said, ‘the board 
members are similar to what they would be in a private company….it’s a practical 
choice rather than a social choice... They [the board] are responsible for strategic 
issues including ...  help with key decisions’. In both cases the lead entrepreneurs 
perform the CEO role and are also central in the decision making process of the board 
as they are part of it. They are mandated to make operational decisions and their 
expertise is recognised by their respective boards, a point made by a respondent from 
The Landscaper when he said ‘I still make the day to day decisions and go to them 
[the board] for legal and financial advice’. This response highlights the role of the 
board as adviser and strategy formulator i.e. making key decisions and providing the 
necessary direction and strategic focus required for the organisation to achieve its 
objectives. 
The two CLS organisations had also had mechanisms to co-opt individuals or funders 
onto their boards for the benefit of their organisations. This resonates with the  
resource dependency theory . The Trainer managed to attract three social enterprises 
onto its board, two of which actually bought dividend bearing shares valued at £2500 
each, while The Landscaper was in the process of exploring potential voluntary 
organisations that might be so co-opted. When asked to elaborate further on the 
purchase of shares by social enterprises, the respondent from The Trainer said, ‘yes, 
they [the social enterprises] also want to grow their capital...and it’s good for us that 
we can raise finance this way, without seeking a loan’. He explained further ‘they sit 
on the board and can vote’. The Landscaper made some concessions to allow one of 
its funders, the South Yorkshire Key Fund for social economy, to be included on the 
board. This funder had expressed a commitment, not only to sit on the board, but also 
to purchase dividend bearing shares. This development shows us that even funders 
and Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) are now seriously 
considering their financial survival. The funder’s expectations however were clearly 
stated in their share agreement communication with the social enterprise: 
 
 ‘The shares that the Key fund will take will be preference shares that provide a 
return on interest of 6%…..the interest of this share will be paid in priority to any 
declared dividend’ (South Yorkshire Key Fund, 2004). 
 
Although the dividend rate of return of 6% is quite low compared to commercial rates, 
it nonetheless shows that support organisations are now more interested in growing 
their capital. These are significant developments in the social economy. By co-opting 
a funder onto the board, the Landscaper was establishing links with external 
organisations and ensuring access to financial resources essential for its survival. This 
is a characteristic of the RDT approach . It is important to note that this participation 
of the funder in the governance of the organisation was facilitated by a share capital 
legal structure. It would not have been possible for individuals or organisations such 
as funders to invest in organisations with CLG legal status and expect financial 
benefits through capital growth since CLG has ‘no concept of sharing profits with 
those who are involved in it’.  
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper argues that democratic governance models of social enterprise are still 
relevant in the social economy as they conform to the philanthropic ideology 
underpinning the concept of social enterprise, with a clear desire to protect assets of 
the organisation on behalf of the community and an aversion to trading. However this 
also results in a multiplicity of functional problems and organisations with such 
models struggle to compete in the market for resources and expertise. This paper has 
shown   however that innovation in governance models has become an important pre-
requisite for success in competitive markets. In this instance, moving towards for-
profit stewardship models that are driven by share capital legal structures has opened 
up opportunities that traditional social economy organisations cannot exploit.  
Enterprises with stewardship governance models empower individuals in their  
organisations. The role of the board is restricted to activities such as strategy 
formulation, advising and recruitment, leaving top management to address operational 
issues. These are key features of the stewardship approach to governance which is a 
new trajectory that the social enterprise sector is exploring.  
 The emergence of stewardship governance models of social enterprise reflects their 
need to adapt to the pressures of the external economic environment to remain viable. 
Opting for such governance models therefore implies acknowledgement of the 
weaknesses of democratic models of governance as well as a willingness to take risk. 
The stewardship model, though untested, provides social enterprises with the 
flexibility to operate in increasingly competitive environments 
The authors acknowledge the need for further research to explore the stewardship 
governance model for social enterprise as this is a dramatic shift from the ideology 
underpinning the concept. It is therefore important to note that the economic 
environment of non-profits is complex and heterogeneous compared to that of the 
commercial sector. 
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